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TEXT:
Abstract: EU civilian missions are a tool to bridge new security gaps. They focus on security problems that cannot be
adequately addressed by military capabilities alone. These missions operationalize the idea of liberal peace, ie the link
between the (democratic, liberal etc.) 'quality' of domestic institutions and international peace. The purpose of these missions
is to reform (or establish) a State security sector based upon these qualities.
Taking the most advanced EU civilian mission to date, EULEX Kosovo, as an object of study, this article examines a particular
legal problem that ensues when the rule of law is 'exported': in order to fulfil its rule of law-exporting task, the mission enjoys
broad executive powers. This, in turn, requires that the mission itself must be bound by the principles it seeks to 'export'. The
rule of law serves, in other words, both as a policy-tool and as a constraint for EULEX. As both dimensions are connected, the
failure of one will likely affect the performance of the other.
The article concludes that while the hybrid approach to the rule of law by EULEX is a promising tool to address security gaps
resulting from new threats in post-conflict societies, the present weakness of the constraint function negatively affects the
performance of the mission as a whole.
1. Introduction
The idea that 'public security' can be exported by international actors is nothing new. n1 Beginning in the 1960s, public
security-export has been an important feature of the UN administration of territories. n2 By means of UN missions,
the international community exercised (to a varying degree) public security powers that are normally assigned to the
territorial State, eg the protection of civilians (from physical violence), the disarmament of non-State actors, the protection of
critical infrastructures, the maintenance of corrections facilities, border management, etc.
Public security-export is not a UN monopoly. The EU followed the UN's lead in the beginning of the 2000s. Since then,
the EU has acted as a security-exporter by operating several civilian missions as a response to the emergence of newly
perceived security threats. n3 In its 2003 Security Strategy, the EU diagnosed that post-Cold War security threats are no
longer of a purely military nature and therefore cannot be adequately addressed by an exclusively military response. n4
Dynamic threats, such as terrorism, organized crime, failed States or regional conflicts resulting in new 'security gaps', call for
a multi-instrumental approach, not only deploying military, but also civilian capabilities. n5 Civilian crisis management by EU
missions has been one response to address new 'security gaps' and figures as a central tool of European external politics today.
n6 With their unique focus on the provision of public security by means of strengthening civilian capabilities, such as police or
rule of law institutions, EU civilian missions attempt to address 'security gaps' that cannot be remedied by the sole
employment of military capabilities. n7
Some EU civilian missions are explicitly framed as 'rule of law'-exporting missions. n8 While there is an intuitive
connection between the 'rule of law' (RoL) and 'public security', the particular design of EU 'rule of law'-exporting missions is
more complex. The foundational idea of such missions is the following: the RoL and the provision of law-based procedures for
social cooperation and conflict resolution cater to public security. The existence of public security, in turn, is considered a
condition of interstate peace, as a large number of grave conflicts today are rooted in domestic tensions and violence. The idea
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that the RoL and international peace are connected can be traced back primarily to Immanuel Kant, who proclaimed that
republican states will form a pacific union and refrain from engaging in war with each other as a result of their particular civil
constitution. n9 In more recent times, the Kantian approach has been recast as the idea of 'liberal peace', ie the belief that
'perfect' (State and societal) institutions (democratic government, liberal economy, RoL-based legal system) lead to
international peace and security. n10 Jack Levy, for example, is famously known for stating that "the absence of war between
democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations". n11 The idea of liberal peace
also constitutes a philosophical foundation for EU civilian missions: RoL-abiding institutions can be established with the
support of the European mission that cater to public security domestically and to international peace.
The main argument made by the article is this: if the idea of EU civilian missions is to 'export' the RoL, the mission must-
depending on its mandate-adopt a complex, hybrid approach to the RoL. The hybridity results from a 'double' application of the
idea of liberal peace. First, the RoL serves as a policy-tool to establish and maintain public security and, consequently,
international peace. The idea is to rebuild or establish RoL-conforming (security) structures and institutions (such as police,
public prosecutor's office and courts). This is in line with the idea of liberal peace as applied to a post-conflict society. Second,
the RoL serves as
a constraint on the EU mission itself. According to the idea of liberal peace, the mission itself is a 'perfectible institution'
that must be construed with regard to the liberal ideals, among which the RoL has a prominent place. Underlying the latter
argument is the belief that all institutions (domestic or international) can harm individuals. Just by being an 'international'
creation, an institution is not dignified or immunized, but (depending on the robustness of the mission's mandate) must itself be
tested against the values or principles that it seeks to export or defend. In sum, we propose that the RoL in EU civilian missions
does not merely serve as a policy-instrument or good that can be exported, but that the RoL serves as a legal constraint on the
mission itself.
This article examines both functions of the RoL in the context of the EU Rule of Law Mission to Kosovo (EULEX).
Initially employed in 2008, EULEX is the largest EU civilian mission to date. n12 It succeeded the UN Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK), which had been created by the Security Council under Chapter VII. n13 The civilian mission of EULEX is used as
a tool to bridge the security gap threatening the stability of Kosovo and the whole region as a result of the Kosovo War. n14 To
fulfil this complex task, EULEX's mandate contains extensive powers to reform Kosovo's public security institutions. At the
same time, EULEX is the only EU civilian mission at present endowed with its own executive tasks, thus replacing, or at least
complementing, the State authorities in certain areas. Given its unique structure, the hybridity of the RoL as both a constraint
and as a policy-tool can be studied.
The question addressed in this article is whether the EU hybrid approach to the RoL offers a normatively desirable
mechanism to bridge the security gaps that often arise from post-conflict scenarios. The article is structured as follows: the
first part describes the conceptual framework, defining the two main concepts used in the article, 'authority' and the 'RoL ', and
discusses them in the context of EU civilian missions. The second part addresses the problem of RoL as a constraint on
EULEX. The third part deals with the RoL as an instrument of EULEX to advance public security. The article concludes that
the hybrid approach to the RoL gives rise to high expectations concerning the performance of EU civilian missions as external
'civilizers'. However, since both functions of the RoL are connected, an inadequately developed and implemented constraint-
function of the RoL for EU civilian missions has negative repercussions on a mission's ability to rely on the RoL as a
policy-tool. Ultimately, insufficiencies of the constraint-function of the RoL may endanger the success of the mission.
2. Authority of EU Civilian Missions and the Rule of Law
Civilian missions are a central instrument of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy and manifest the EU's
ambition to emerge as a 'civilizer' on the global level. n15 The following part clarifies two concepts central to the question
raised in this article, 'authority' and the 'RoL '.
A. Types of Authority Exercised by EU Civilian Missions
EU civilian missions exercise specific types of 'authority'. The concept of 'authority' is of an explanatory value insofar as
it captures the circumstances triggering constitutional concerns, among others, the principle of the RoL. For the purpose of this
article, we adopt a normative conception of 'authority': authority in a normative sense means 'legitimate authority' as opposed
to 'factual' or 'brute' power. n16 Drawing on a definition by Bogdandy et al, 'authority' means the legitimate capacity of one
person to unilaterally alter or impact the conduct or legal position of others. n17 EU civilian missions may exercise three
different types of authority: they usually exercise 'political authority' when charged with advisory or even (binding)
correctional functions in relation to governments and governmental acts. They may exercise 'public authority' when taking
(unilateral) binding decisions vis-à-vis private individuals and entities on foreign territory, n18 and 'institutional authority' by
means of organizational acts affecting
third parties, eg when acting as a public employer or public contractor on the market. n19
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B. External Exercise of Public Authority as a Rule of Law Problem
How does the exercise of public authority by EU civilian missions implicate the RoL? From a constitutionalist
perspective, it is an enduring inheritance of liberalism that the exercise of public (ie coercive, unilateral) authority vis-à-vis
individuals must be restricted by constitutional principles, including the RoL. n20 The necessity to check and restrain public
power does not end when it is exercised by, or shared with, international or regional actors. n21 Once the territorial State opens
up its 'sovereignty shield' and allows international or regional actors to exercise public authority on its behalf, or where it is
required to do so by international law, the RoL as a constitutional principle is implied.
On the level of positive law, the principle of the RoL has been firmly established for EU internal relations. In 1986, the
RoL was recognized as a constitutional principle of the EU in the landmark decision Les Verts. n22 The Treaty on European
Union (TEU)-as a 'constitutional document' of the EU-makes explicit reference to the RoL at various points. n23 The situation
is less clear, however, with regard to EU external relations, ie acts of EU organs in non- Member States. Article 21(1) TEU
holds that the EU shall be 'guided by' and seek to 'advance' the RoL in its external actions. n24 While the text of the TEU
appears to establish rather mild constitutional obligations for EU civilian missions, it cannot be doubted that the EU must also
be bound by RoL-principles when exercising public authority 'abroad'. It cannot make a difference where EU organs exercise
public authority for the RoL to be implied. n25 Any deviation
from the general rule-that the RoL applies to any exercise of public authority by the EU-would have to be justified. A
mere lack of resources or the (unqualified) reference to a tense public security situation, eg cannot-in our view-justify a
deviation of EU external action from RoL-principles. This, in turn, implies that EULEX Kosovo, in so far as it exercises public
authority, must adhere to the RoL already by virtue of EU constitutional law.
When does EULEX exercise public authority? In 2008, EULEX took over UNMIK's tasks in the field of police and
justice. n26 Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC Res) 1244 had established 'an international civil and
security presence in Kosovo with full civil and political authority and sole responsibility for the governance of Kosovo', n27
EULEX only retains 'certain executive responsibilities'. n28 The exercise of executive power by EULEX is a clear case of
'public authority', as defined above, since the mission has the legal capacity to take binding, unilateral decisions on individuals.
EULEX is entrusted with the exercise of public authority in four distinct contexts: first, EULEX has executive powers with
regard to public security, relating primarily to the police, the office of the public prosecutor and customs. n29 Second, EULEX
has adjudicative powers in relation to specific crimes (war crimes, terrorism, organized crime, corruption etc.). n30 Third,
EULEX may reverse or annul operational decisions taken by the Kosovo authorities (corrective powers). n31 Fourth, there is a
broad provision in EULEX's mandate, holding that EULEX shall 'assume other responsibilities, independently (...) to ensure
the maintenance and promotion of the RoL, public order and security, in consultation with the relevant Council agencies'
(subsidiary power). n32
C. Conceptions of the Rule of Law
EU constitutional law does not provide any guidance as to what conception of the RoL EU civilian missions are obliged to
follow. In the literature, three RoL-conceptions are predominantly discussed: a formal, a substantive and a functional
understanding of the RoL. We argue that-in relation to external EU action-a functional RoL-conception should apply.
The formal understanding of the RoL originates in England in the 18th century and focuses on (technical) restrictions to
the exercise of governmental power, such as 'rule by law', 'supremacy of the law', 'equality before the law', 'formal legality',
'open government' and others. n33 Some have argued that Article 2 TEU contains a formal understanding as it explicitly
distinguishes the RoL from other constitutional principles, such as democracy and human rights. n34 This argument, however,
seems too formalistic in our view.
The substantive interpretation of the RoL is often associated with the German idea of the 'Rechtsstaat' and incorporates the
idea of 'good' law into the definition by demanding conformity of a legal system with ideals such as democracy, human rights
or-even more abstractly-justice and reason. n35 There are good reasons to believe that the EU follows a substantive conception
of the RoL. Pech has argued that the EU 'constitution', viewed as a whole, suggests that the Union's foundational principles are
interdependent and must be construed in light of each other. n36 Similarly, the recently published Commission Framework,
which seeks to resolve future threats to the RoL in EU Member States, explicitly states that the RoL-principles developed by
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Venice
Commission 'are not purely formal and procedural requirements', but that 'they are the vehicle for ensuring compliance with
and respect for democracy and human rights'. n37
According to the document, the RoL is a constitutional principle with both formal and substantive components (as
substantiated in the case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR). Besides 'formal' criteria (legality, legal certainty, prohibition of
arbitrariness, independent and impartial courts as well as equality before the law), the framework adds 'effective judicial review
including respect for fundamental rights' to the definition of the RoL. n38 In the 'EU Concept for CSDP Justice Missions', the
EU decided to follow the substantive RoL-definition of the UN Secretary General. n39 In practice, the EU has thus accepted a
substantive RoL-conception for its external actions.
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Finally, there is a functional conception of the RoL. On this account, no fixed (substantive or formal) content can be
attached to the RoL. The RoL is considered to be of no intrinsic value as such, but serves other constitutional principles or
goals. According to Chesterman, a functional approach looks at the function that the RoL is intended to serve in a given
society. n40 Thus, according to a functional understanding, the RoL caters to the realization of other ideals, such as the
prevention of arbitrary government, ensuring human rights-conformity of executive action, fostering stable economic
development or the non-violent solution of political disputes. n41
We endorse a functional conception of the RoL for EU civilian missions. The content of the RoL with regard to external
EU actions is dynamic, not fixed. It is determined by taking into account the type of authority a mission exercises. What the
RoL requires depends on the type of authority (public, political, or institutional) the EU exercises in the individual case. For
example, if a EU civilian mission exercises 'public authority' (where the RoL has the function to constrain such acts), the RoL
serves ideals such as preventing arbitrary rule
and ensuring human rights-conformity of executive action. Given this function, the RoL essentially requires legal and
institutional safeguards (eg access to judicial review) benefiting individual, non-state addressees of public authority acts. In
contrast, where EULEX exercises 'political authority' (where the RoL has the function of a policy-tool), the RoL serves ideals
such as public security or stable economic development. In this case, the RoL requires, eg accountability mechanisms or
instruments to prevent corruption benefiting the overall political situation in the territory.
3. Rule of Law as a Constraint to EULEX
This part deals with the first aspect of the EU hybrid approach: the RoL as a constraint to the exercise of public authority
by EULEX. How is the constraining- function of the RoL implemented in the case of EULEX? In order to meaningfully assess
EULEX's RoL-performance, one needs to distinguish specific RoL-requirements that are designed to prevent arbitrary rule and
ensure the human rights-conformity of executive action by EULEX. To formulate specific RoL-requirements, we draw on a
recent approach by Bedner who has proposed a 'research tool', differentiating three categories of RoL-requirements: the first
category relates to 'procedural elements' (eg rule by law and formal legality), the second concerns 'substantive elements' (eg
protection of individual rights and liberties) and the third pertains to 'controlling mechanisms' (eg independent tribunals and
courts). n42 The constraining function of the RoL for EU civilian missions is a crucial factor in guaranteeing that the EU is
locally and internationally perceived as a legitimate actor in the provision of security. n43 As outlined in the introduction, the
notion of the RoL as a constraint follows from the application of the idea of liberal peace to the mission itself.
A. Procedural Requirements
Taking into account that EULEX exercises 'public authority', two procedural requirements of the RoL are particularly
important: the 'rule by law' and 'formal legality'. n44 As applied to EULEX, 'rule by law' requires a constitutional framework
that defines the conduct of the mission's organs. EULEX's legal
capacity to exercise public authority is determined by a constitutional framework of international, European and, arguably,
Kosovar constitutional law.
EULEX formally operates in the framework of UNSC Res 1244. n45 From a RoL-perspective, the consequences of
EULEX's submission to UNSC Res 1244 are drastic: due to the requirement of neutrality regarding Kosovo's status, the EU is
formally not authorized to engage in state-building activities. 'Status-neutrality' implies that EULEX has to adhere to the
UNMIK body of law when carrying out its executive mandate. This, however, would exclude the laws of Kosovo established
under the new Constitution of Kosovo (Constitution) after its independence. n46 Consequently, EULEX officials would be
barred from applying those Kosovar laws they helped drafting (and which were given democratic legitimacy by the Kosovo
legislature). n47 In practice, EULEX tends to ignore this legal implication. n48 Regarding EULEX's basis in EU constitutional
law, the mission was established under Article 14 TEU (post-Lisbon Article 28 TEU) and Article 25(3) TEU (post-Lisbon
Article 38(3) TEU). n49 The mission is carried out within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP), a largely intergovernmental field of EU action, which leads to limited judicial review n50 and minimal involvement of
the European Parliament. n51 From a RoL-perspective, both result in a reduced accountability of the EU in this policy field.
n52 Lastly, Kosovar constitutional law is relevant since it defines the space in which the (new) Kosovar state has opened up its
'sovereignty shield' and integrated the exercise of public authority by international actors into its domestic legal order. n53 The
Constitution mentions EULEX only once. n54 However, EULEX may be regarded as an 'other actor mandated under the
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement'
(Ahtisaari Plan) n55 with which 'all authorities in the Republic of Kosovo shall cooperate fully' and to whose 'decisions or
acts' they 'shall (...) give effect'. n56 The Ahtisaari Plan refers to the 'European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Mission'
in Annex X. n57 The Constitution, thus, endows EULEX with constitutional status, taking precedence over all legal provisions,
which, arguably, includes the Constitution itself. n58
Another procedural element of importance when restraining public authority is the 'principle of legality'. n59 The
principle of formal legality is often considered to entail (at least) three sub-requirements: that acts of a 'public authority' must
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have a legal basis, that the legal basis be accessible and that the wording must be sufficiently clear. n60 The executive tasks of
EULEX in the field of policing, justice and customs are based on its mandate. n61 In addition, EULEX officials are required to
respect the applicable local laws. This obligation flows from Article 41(1) Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of
1961, which applies to EULEX personnel as an international legal obligation. n62 This provision, however, is unenforceable as
a result of the privileges and immunities granted to EULEX. n63
There has also been criticism with regard to the insufficiently clear framing of EULEX's public authority-powers. One
problem is the ambiguity of the different
language versions of the reverse and annulment-power as to whether prior consultation of the relevant international
civilian authorities is mandatory or discretionary for EULEX. n64 Another problem is the broad wording of EULEX's
subsidiary power. n65 Additionally, one of the central planning documents of the mission, the Operation Plan (OPLAN), n66 is
a restricted document, giving rise to concerns with regard to the accessibility of the legal basis and the transparency of EULEX.
The greatest concern in the context of formal legality, however, is the amalgamation of international, European and Kosovar
law. All of these legal regimes interact when EULEX's 'public authority' is at stake. Given this complex interplay of legal
regimes in Kosovo, it is not surprising that some qualify 'its legal framework, which is an unclear and inconsistent mix of
former Yugoslav, UNMIK and more recent legislation' as a central problem. n67
B. Substantive Requirements
A substantive RoL-requirement is the conformity of all laws and legal acts with human rights. n68 The exercise of public
authority demands compliance with human rights and there is no reason to treat EU internal or external action differently in
this regard. Its mandate requires EULEX to 'ensure that all its activities respect international standards concerning human rights
and gender mainstreaming' without, however, specifying these. n69 In its jurisprudence, the HRRP regularly refers to the
obligation of EULEX to comply with international standards of human rights. n70 These 'international standards' are primarily
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and UNSC Res 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security. n71 A look
at the practice of the HRRP confirms that the Panel predominantly relies on the ECHR. n72 To this, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union can be added. n73
Even though the Kosovar Constitution as such does not create enforceable obligations for EULEX, one can argue that the
Kosovar government has a subsidiary duty to ensure that the practice of EULEX remains within the boundaries of the
Constitution. The Constitution in Chapter II contains a comprehensive catalogue of fundamental rights and freedoms.
Additionally, eight international human rights instruments are directly applicable in Kosovo, according to Article 22. Article 3
of the Constitution guarantees that the exercise of public authority in Kosovo 'shall be based upon the principles of equality of
all individuals before the law and with full respect for internationally recognized fundamental rights and freedoms.' EULEX
exercises such public authority in Kosovo. If the Kosovar parliament ratifies an international agreement that delegates State
powers to EULEX according to Article 20(1) of the Constitution, n74 one may argue that the responsibility to ensure that
EULEX respects fundamental rights and freedoms, as enshrined in the Constitution, rests with the Kosovar government itself.
A similar idea is captured in international law when the ECtHR holds states responsible under Article 1 ECHR for all acts and
omissions of their organs, even if acting in compliance with international legal obligations. n75 A Member State cannot free
itself from its (human rights) obligations by opening up its sovereignty shield and allowing international actors to perform acts
of public authority on its territory. n76 In other words, the Kosovar government is required to ensure that all legal acts of
EULEX remain within the limits of the Kosovar Constitution.
C. Controlling Requirements
The last RoL-requirement essential to constraining the exercise of public authority concerns controlling mechanisms that
allow for an 'authoritative determination' of whether laws have been broken. n77 A functional RoL-approach demands a
sufficient form of judicial review of public authority acts by EULEX. Unfortunately, the mission exhibits deficiencies in this
regard.
In 2006, the UNMIK Human Rights Advisory Panel (HRAP) was established. n78 In 2009, the EU installed a similar
body, the HRRP, to review acts
of EULEX. n79 The HRRP has jurisdiction to review alleged human rights violations by EULEX Kosovo in the conduct
of its executive mandate. n80 The panel is not a court in the sense of Article 6 ECHR as it does not have the power to
normatively alter the complainant's legal position. n81 It may only establish a human rights violation and make
recommendations to the EULEX's Head of Mission for remedial action (apart from compensation). n82 Given the limited
judicial review through the HRRP established by the EU, Nolte and Aust argued that 'the EU is not prepared to subject itself to
the same standards of binding judicial review which it requires, for example, of candidates as a condition for joining the
Union'. n83 Similarly, the Venice Commission concluded that EULEX's supportive and corrective acts should be put under a
more stringent review in a generally peaceful situation, as opposed to the initial post-conflict emergency context. n84
4. Rule of Law as a Policy-Tool to Establish Public Security
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The last part discusses the second aspect of the EU hybrid approach, according to which the RoL serves as a policy-tool to
establish and maintain public security n85 in post-conflict scenarios. n86 The choice of the RoL as a tool to establish public
security in Kosovo directly results from Article 21 TEU, which counts the RoL among the principles that shall guide the
Union's action on the international scene and that it shall seek to advance in the wider world. It also reflects the conviction that
the RoL is imperative for the establishment of sustainable security. The employment of the RoL as a policy-tool to advance
public security in Kosovo is further evidenced by the mission statement establishing EULEX to assist Kosovo in the path
towards sustainable stability. n87 The use of the RoL as a
policy-instrument to establish public security is implied by the exercise of 'political authority'. EULEX's mandate
authorizes the exercise of 'political authority' at various points. Generally, EULEX shall monitor, mentor and advise the
competent Kosovo institutions on all areas related to the wider RoL. n88 Furthermore, the mission disposes of a police and a
customs component to support and advise local institutions. n89 Additionally, EULEX is instructed to support the judicial
sector. n90
What are the identified risks to public security that need to be addressed by EULEX's political authority? The mandate
generally highlights measures against corruption and organized crime, n91 two serious security concerns in the area. n92
Another factor is the implications of Kosovo's multi-ethnicity, a crucial driver of the past conflict and a source of serious
political tension in present-day Kosovo. Accordingly, EULEX is to develop and strengthen a multi-ethnic justice system, police
and customs service. n93
The approach of using the RoL as a tool to advance public security rests on two assumptions, namely, that the RoL and
public security are connected and that public security can be 'created' by improving RoL-standards.
It is commonly assumed that the RoL and public security are connected. n94 Precisely how these two concepts relate to
each other, however, is not sufficiently clear. First, public security can be viewed as a necessary precondition for the RoL, ie
without public security, the RoL can neither be established nor maintained. From this perspective, 'public security' is
understood as a factual conditio sine qua non for a functioning RoL. This is why the World Justice Project-when measuring the
RoL-performance of states-measures factors such as 'crime control'. n95 This idea also informed early EU civilian missions
with their focus on the 'strengthening of local police forces', which was considered crucial for reinstalling the RoL. n96
Second, the reverse also holds true: a functioning RoL can be qualified as a necessary condition to create and maintain public
security, ie without RoL-conformity there can be no (or at least
significantly less) public security. n97 UN and EU policy documents require that public security be attained within a rule
of law framework. n98 This relationship between the RoL and security is also why the European Council identified the
strengthening of the rule of law as a necessary concurrent to the strengthening of police capabilities in EU civilian crisis
management. n99 The idea is that 'a democratically run, accountable and efficient security system helps reduce the risk of
conflict, thus creating an enabling environment for development'. n100 This means that there can be no sustainable security
without compliance with RoL-standards. Consequently, it seems appropriate to view public security and the RoL as mutually
constitutive concepts. On the one hand, the level of public security on the ground impacts the degree to which one may speak
of a system based on the RoL, ie public security is functionally related to the RoL (functional relation). On the other hand,
public security without the RoL is illegitimate (normative relation).
The second assumption poses more problems. Can public security actually be exported by establishing the RoL? Some
argue that the international agenda on public security and the RoL should be separated. n101 A first argument relates to a
conceived difference in objectives: while the security agenda relates to the strengthening of State law enforcement capacities,
the RoL-agenda aims at restricting it. n102 Another argument in favour of separation is primarily about efficiency: technical
assistance to reform the security sector can be provided by States and international organizations relatively easily and with
measurable success, while transformational aspirations-related to normative commitments, such as the RoL-are considered
harder to transplant, generating less tangible results. n103 The RoL is not an easily transplanted commodity. Apart from the
respective institutions, a functioning RoL presupposes, so it is argued, a set of normative commitments and beliefs about the
State and society. n104 Some authors therefore caution that there are 'no short-cuts to developing the RoL; in
any country, the realization of the RoL is the result of protracted struggle by many people and organizations on many
different fronts over a long period of time'. n105 To many, a simple 'copy and paste-strategy' of the EU internal RoL-
conception to its external relations, therefore, does not seem appropriate.
There are, however, good reasons in our view to assume that public security, achieved by means of establishing the RoL,
is a 'good' that can be exported: on normative grounds the EU must defend the instrumental relationship between public
security and the RoL, as outlined above, also for its external actions. The RoL is a necessary corollary of legitimate public
security. Public security can neither be enforced, nor can the security sector be reformed without orientation on RoL-
standards. Furthermore, it would negatively affect the EU's credibility as an external actor if it would export standards that lag
behind its internal ambitions.
5. Conclusion: Bridging the Security Gap through an EU Rule of Law?
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Is the EU hybrid approach to the RoL - as a constraint and as a policy-tool - a promising model to bridge security gaps in
post-conflict scenarios? From a normative perspective, the EU must be applauded for its attempt to bridge the security gap
through a hybrid RoL-approach. The deployment of civilian capabilities, such as EULEX, reflects the EU awareness of
security gaps stemming from a new type of security threat that cannot be addressed by military means only. n106 The
destabilizing factors that EULEX confronts in Kosovo, such as corruption, organized crime and inter-ethnic tensions, cannot be
solved with recourse to military capabilities.
However, it must be observed that deficiencies of one RoL-function will impact the success of the other as they are
closely connected. The effectiveness of the EU endeavour to export public security hinges on how the EU handles its own
RoL-problems regarding the external exercise of public authority. Additionally, the fact that Kosovo is integrated in the
Stabilization and Association Process, and therefore a potential candidate for a future EU enlargement, blurs the line between
EU internal and external security, further strengthening the argument for an effective constraining function of the RoL to avoid
the creation of a 'legitimacy gap' while closing the 'security gap'. EU civilian missions with a clear executive mandate, such as
EULEX, must comply
with EU RoL-standards in practice. In this regard, EULEX exhibits huge shortcomings, not all of which can be attributed
to the precarious situation resulting from the amalgamation of international, European and Kosovar law. Eventually, the EU's
success as an external actor may not stumble over the fact that EULEX did not manage to solve the actual public security
problems of Kosovo, but over its own RoL-deficit. n107
There will be demand for robust and comprehensive EU civilian missions elsewhere in the world. Public security, in ever
more places, will depend on RoL-export. It seems crucial that EU civilian missions, when exercising authority abroad, act
according to EU constitutional principles, among which the RoL is of central importance. Not only must the RoL be exported,
it must be lived by EU civilian missions themselves.
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